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Abstract
New Zealand (NZ) was the first developed country to have signed a free trade agree-
ment (FTA) with China. We investigate the effects of the 2008 NZ-China FTA on (i)
exports from NZ to China, and (ii) real GDP per capita in NZ using the synthetic
control method that focuses on estimating the counterfactual outcomes. We find that
NZ exports to China were more than 200% higher in 2013 and 2014 than what they
would have been if NZ had never signed the FTA with China. Even though the NZ
export sector experienced gains from the 2008 FTA, this agreement did not have any
observable impact on real GDP per capita of NZ.
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1 Introduction
New Zealand (NZ) was the first developed country to have signed a free trade agreement
(FTA) with China. The NZ-China FTA took effect in October 2008, resulting in a large
increase in trade between the two countries. We study this event from the perspective
of a policy evaluation problem and investigate the effects of the 2008 NZ-China FTA on
trade flows (exports from NZ to China) and income (real GDP per capita in NZ) using
the synthetic control method (SCM) that focuses on estimating the counterfactuals. We
use a combination of other OECD countries to construct a “synthetic” control NZ, which
resembles relevant economic characteristics of the NZ economy before signing the FTA with
China. The subsequent economic evolution of this “counterfactual” NZ without the FTA
with China is compared to the actual experience of the NZ economy.
We ask two questions in this paper. Question one asks: Have NZ’s exports to China
increased significantly because of the 2008 FTA? We find that NZ exports to China were
more than 200% higher in 2013 and 2014 than what they would have been if NZ had never
signed the FTA with China. We also explore trade creation and trade diversion effects of
the 2008 FTA for NZ exports. That is, as NZ experienced larger commodity exports going
to China, it also experienced declines in exports to other major trading partners, such as
Australia and the United States (US). We extend our analysis to examine trade creation
and trade diversion effects. We find that total commodity exports from NZ to the world
would have been 22% less than what they are today had the FTA never occurred. This
trade creation effect can be mainly seen through NZ’s most important export category ‘food
and live animal’, which includes dairy products. We find that this sector’s exports to China
would have been 185.5% less in the counterfactual outcome. The second question we ask is:
How has the FTA with China affected the welfare of the NZ economy? We find that even
though the NZ export sector experienced gains from the 2008 FTA, this FTA did not have
any observable impact on real GDP per capita, where GDP per person is an informative
indicator of welfare across a broad range of countries.
Our paper, to the best of our knowledge, is one of the first (if not the first) study that
provides a systematic quantitative analysis of the 2008 NZ-China FTA on the economic
performance of NZ with several counterfactual comparisons.1 Our paper is related to a
small but growing literature that tries to understand the impact of past trade agreements
using the SCM. The two papers most closely related to ours are Hannan (2016) and Hannan
(2017). Hannan (2016) explores the impact of past trade agreements using 104 country pairs
1There are some descriptive studies on China’s impact on the NZ economy. See, for example, Bowman
and Conway, 2013a,b; Kendall, 2014. Osborn and Vehbi (2013) provide a quantitative analysis of the impact
on NZ of economic growth in China employing a vector autoregressive model.
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that had engaged in trade agreements between 1983 and 1995, and finds that substantial
gains are generated, with average increases in exports of 80%, and annual growth of 3.8%.
Hannan (2017) employs the SCM to determine the impact of trade agreements for 64 Latin
American country pairs in the 1989-1996 period. Her results suggest that trade agreements
have markedly boosted exports in Latin America, on average by 76.4 percentage points over
ten years. Hosny (2012) and Aytuğ et al. (2017) provide more specific examples of trade
agreements between countries. Hosny (2012) studies Algeria’s trade agreement with the
Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and investigates what would have happened if
Algeria had signed this FTA in 1998 instead of 2005. Hosny’s results suggest that Algeria’s
trade would have improved in comparison with the counterfactual. Aytuğ et al. (2017) study
the effects of EU-Turkey Customs Union (CU) on the Turkish economy. By implementing the
SCM the authors find that had Turkey not joined the CU, GDP per capita would have fallen
by 13% and exports would have fallen by 38%. By exploring the ‘what if’ counterfactuals,
we aim to dissect the magnitude of bilateral trade agreements on NZ exports and explore
the gains from trade, both at the aggregate and sector levels. A further novel contribution
to the trade literature is the direct examination of the welfare effect from trade and its
impact on NZ. We do this by studying the evolution of real GDP per capita and estimating
the counterfactual real GDP per capita of having never signed the FTA with China. This
counterfactual analysis quantifies the effect of the 2008 FTA on NZ’s economic well-being,
proxied by real GDP per capita that captures the effects of terms of trade changes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents information
regarding China, a major trade partner of NZ. Section 3 discusses the SCM as a tool for
counterfactual analysis and reviews the related literature. Section 4 presents our quantitative
analysis for NZ’s exports to China. Section 5 provides the SCM results for the evolution of
real GDP per capita in NZ. Section 6 concludes.
2 The 2008 NZ-China FTA
For many years, China’s development was largely indigenous, mainly because of the coun-
try’s isolation from the rest of the world. However, over the last three decades China has
become an increasingly important part of the global trading system. China has become the
leading exporter for merchandise trade and China’s accession to the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) has been marked as an important milestone. China officially started its WTO
membership application in 1986 and was formally accepted on 11 December 2001.2 In accor-
2In 1997 NZ became the first country to agree to China’s accession to the WTO by concluding the bi-
lateral negotiations component of that process (https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/
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dance with WTO rules, China committed to liberalize further and to better integrate into
the global economy. China has signed several FTAs to strengthen international economic
cooperation since 2002.3 NZ was the first developed country to commence FTA negotiations
with China. In November 2004, NZ and China launched FTA negotiations and in April
2008, NZ became the first OECD country to successfully conclude FTA negotiations with
China.4 On 7 April 2008, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and NZ Prime Minister Helen Clark
witnessed the signing of the NZ-China FTA in Beijing, which came into force on 1 October
2008. Since then, NZ has seen dramatic increases in bilateral trade with China.


































Figure 1: NZ’s exports to and imports from China, 1979-2017
Figure 1 shows that China gradually became NZ’s main source of (commodity) imports.5
NZ’s imports from China in 1979 were little higher than US$ 37 million, which increased
to more than US$ 7.7 billion in 2017. NZ’s share of imports from China, which was only
0.8% of China, was around 20% in 2017. In addition, China has become NZ’s top commodity
export destination in recent years; for example, 22.3% of NZ’s exports went to China in 2017.
Exports to China were close to US$ 90 million in 1979; however, they now sit at almost US$
8.5 billion. NZ’s export share to China was only 1.9% in 1979, and this share tripled by
north-asia/china/).
3See China FTA Network for details of these FTAs as well as the agreements being negotiated
(http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml).
4Chile-China FTA was signed in November 2005 and entered into force in October 2006. However, Chile
was not an OECD country at that time. Chile became an OECD member on 7 May 2010.
5Data are from the United Nations’ Comtrade Database (https://comtrade.un.org).
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Figure 2: Shares of NZ total commodity imports and exports (%), 1981-2017
Figure 2 shows how China has become a major trading partner for NZ in terms of
total trade of merchandise goods.6,7 Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows NZ’s three most important
partners in terms of total commodity imports. In 1981, Australia and the US together
supplied 36.2% of NZ’s commodity imports. That share declined to 22.9% in 2017 as China
increased its share of NZ’s imports from 0.7% in 1981 to almost 20% in 2017. China gradually
became NZ’s main source of imports. Panel (b) in Figure 2 plots NZ’s three most important
trade partners in terms of total commodity exports. In 1981, NZ’s share of exports to
Australia and the US totalled 26.5%, whereas the corresponding share of exports to China
was only 2.2%. The share of exports going to China had gradually increased to 5.3% in
2007. After the FTA was signed in 2008, there was a marked increase in NZ’s export share
going to China. However, the share of exports going to the US declined from 11.5% in 2007
to 9.9% in 2017. The corresponding figures for Australia were 21.9% in 2007 and 16.4% in
2017.8
6Data are from the United Nations’ Comtrade Database (https://comtrade.un.org).
7In terms of goods and services (not just commodities), Australia remains NZ’s top trading partner, with
China NZ’s second biggest trading partner (https://www.mfat.govt.nz/).
8However, NZ remains a relatively unimportant trading partner for China. This is not surprising con-
sidering the relative sizes of each economy. NZ’s population is less than 5 million people, whereas China’s
population is more than 1.3 billion people. China was a US$ 12.2 trillion economy in 2017 making it the
4
In 2005 China’s average applied tariff was around 10% across all products, with a higher
average of 14.6% applied to agriculture product (MFAT, 2007). The FTA resulted in the
removal of these tariffs and reduction of other impediments to bilateral trade over time.
Tariffs are now eliminated for over 97% of NZ goods exports to China. In 2018, all exports
other than dairy (some products remain subject to tariffs and safeguards that will be phased
out by 2024), and a small number of products that were excluded from the FTA are eligible
for tariff-free access into China. In 2018, all imports from China are eligible for tariff-
free access.9 Currently, China and NZ are negotiating to upgrade the existing 2008 FTA.
Negotiations commenced in April 2017 and the sixth round was held in Beijing in November
2018. The upgraded FTA will add new provisions to the existing Agreement.10
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 The Potential Outcome Model of Causal Inference
Program evaluation methodologies have long been used to measure the effect of different
economic or political interventions (treatments). The central problem in causal inference is
evaluating how exposure of a treatment on a set of units (or individuals) has affected their
outcomes.11 Let us illustrate this using the potential outcome set up (Rubin, 1974; Holland,
1986; Imbens and Rubin, 2015). Consider J + 1 units over t = 1, ..., T0, T0 + 1, ..., T periods.
The first unit is affected uninterruptedly by an intervention in period T0 + 1 until period T ,
after an initial pre-intervention period t = 1, ..., T0. The leftover J units are the controls that
form the so-called ‘donor pool’, and they are not affected by the intervention (Gardeazabal
and Vega-Bayo, 2017). Let Yj,t denote the outcome variable of unit j at period t. Y
1
j,t and
Y 0j,t denote the potential outcome of unit j at time t under treatment and in the absence




j,t, where Dj,t is dummy
variable that takes value 1 if unit j is under treatment at time t and value 0 otherwise.
The identification problem is that the treatment effect depends on the potential outcome in
both states (Dj,t = 0 and Dj,t = 1), while we can only observe realizations under one of the
potential treatment statuses.
second largest in the world in terms of nominal GDP. On the other hand, NZ’s GDP was little higher than





11See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) and Athey and Imbens (2017) for comprehensive reviews of the recent
developments in program evaluation literature.
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3.2 The Synthetic Control Approach
Building on an idea in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010) develop the
synthetic control method (SCM) that exploits variation over time in the outcomes of units
that are either exposed to treatment only after some period or that are never exposed (see
also Abadie et al., 2015). A primary reason to use this method is to control for the effect of
unobservable factors that have an impact on the common time trend in the treatment and
control groups (Abadie et al., 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2016). Since its introduction, the SCM
has seen a range of applications in economics, political science, and international relations.12
In the words of Athey and Imbens (2017, p. 9), the synthetic control approach is “arguably
the most important innovation in the policy evaluation literature in the last 15 years.”
Suppose that we observe data for (J + 1) ∈ N countries. We also assume that there is a
treatment that affects only country 1 from period T0 + 1 to period T uninterruptedly, where
T0 ∈ (1, T ) ∩ N. In other words, without loss of generality, we assume that first country
signed a FTA with China, so that we have J remaining countries that serve as potential
controls. Let the scalar Y 0j,t be the potential outcome that would be observed for country
j in period t if there were no treatment for j ∈ 1, ..., J + 1 and t ∈ 1, ..., T . Let the scalar
Y 1j,t be the potential outcome that would be observed for country j in period t if country
j received the treatment (i.e., signed the FTA with China) from period T0 + 1 to period
T . We define αj,t = Y
1
j,t − Y 0j,t as the treatment effect for country j in period t and Dj,t as
the treatment indicator that assumes value 1 if country j is treated in period t and value 0
otherwise. The observed outcome for country j in period t is given by
Yj,t = Y
0
j,t(1−Dj,t) + Y 1j,tDj,t. (1)
Because only the first country is exposed to the intervention and only from period T0 + 1 to
T , we have that
Dj,t =
1, if j = 1 and t > T00, otherwise. (2)
12Examples of such applications include openness and trade liberalization policies (Nannicini and Billmeier,
2011; Billmeier and Nannicini, 2013; Ritzel and Kohler, 2017), impact of trade agreements (Hosny, 2012;
Hannan, 2016, 2017; Aytuğ et al., 2017), impact of joining a currency union (Saia, 2017; Puzzello and
Gomis-Porqueras, 2018), economic regimes/political stability (Grier and Maynard, 2016; Meyersson, 2017;
Jales et al., 2018; Matta et al., forthcoming), natural disasters (Coffman and Noy, 2012; Cavallo et al., 2013;
Mideksa, 2013; Barone and Mocetti, 2014; Mohan, 2017), terrorism, civil wars, crime, and political risks
(Montalvo, 2011; Pinotti, 2015; Singhal and Nilakatan, 2016; Bilgel and Karahasan, 2017; Bove et al., 2017;
Costalli et al., 2017; Bove and Elia, 2018), health economics (Bilgel and Galle, 2015; Krief et al., 2016),
economic sanctions (Gharehgozli, 2017), migration (Powell et al., 2017), and natural resource discoveries
(Smith, 2015).
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The goal is to estimate the treatment effect on the treated, i.e., α1,t = Y
1
1,t − Y 01,t. Recall
that we have defined αj,t = Y
1
j,t − Y 0j,t. This guarantees that we only need to estimate the
counterfactual Y 01,t to identify (α1,T0+1, ..., α1,T ) because Y
1
1,t is observable for t > T0 (Ferman
et al., 2018). Since Y 01,t for t > T0 is not observed, the main idea of the SCM is to consider
a weighted average of the control countries to construct a proxy for this counterfactual.
Let W = (w2, ..., wJ+1)
′ be a collection of weights, with wj ≥ 0 and for j = 2, ..., J + 1
and w2 +w3 + ...+wJ+1 = 1. Each value of W represents a potential synthetic control. Let
X1 be a (K × 1) vector of pre-intervention (pre-FTA) values of K predictors for the treated
country (NZ). Let X0 be a (K×J) matrix which contains the values of the same variables for
the J possible control countries. Let V be a diagonal matrix with nonnegative components.
The values of the diagonal elements of V reflect the relative importance of the different




chosen to minimize (X1 −X0W)′V(X1 −X0W) subject to w∗j ≥ 0 for j = 2, ..., J + 1 and∑J+1
j=2 w
∗ = 1. The synthetic control estimator of the effect of the treatment for the treated





Cattaneo, 2018). Arguably, the choice of V could be subjective and Abadie and Gardeazabal
(2003) and Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) propose data-driven selectors of V.
Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) use a minimum distance approach, combined with the re-
striction that the resulting weights are nonnegative and sum to one.13 The synthetic control
is calculated as convex combination of the countries in the donor pool and best replicates
the outcome variable of the treated country in the pre-intervention period. As long as the
weights reflect structural parameters that would not vary in the absence of the 2008 China-
NZ FTA, the synthetic control provides a counterfactual scenario for the evolution of the
NZ economy in the absence of this FTA (Pinotti, 2015).14
13Abadie and Cattaneo (2018) note that in general (that is, ruling out certain degenerate cases) if X1
does not belong to the convex hull of the columns of X0, then W
∗ is unique and sparse, meaning that W∗
has only a few nonzero elements. Doudchenko and Imbens (2016) propose a more general class of synthetic
control estimators, which allow the weights to be negative and do not necessarily restrict the sum of the
weights. Abadie and L’Hour (2018) address the problem of multiplicity of solutions, which is finding a
synthetic control that best reproduces the characteristics of a treated unit may not have a unique solution.
A recent research agenda focuses on (robust) generalization of the SCM (see, for example, Xu, 2017; Amjad
et al., 2018; Becker and Klößner, 2018).
14The SCM builds on difference-in-differences (DID) estimation, but when constructing the counterfactual,
SCM puts more weight on donor countries that closely resemble the treated country, whereas the DID
approach assigns equal weight to each donor country. Therefore, the SCM uses systematically more attractive
comparisons than those of the traditional DID estimation (Athey and Imbens, 2017).
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3.2.1 Placebo Tests
In order to ensure that a particular synthetic control estimate reflects the impact of the
2008 FTA, we perform a series of falsifications tests known as in-space placebo tests. We
apply in-space placebo tests by applying the SCM on countries in the donor pool that did
not sign a FTA with China. These tests compare the magnitude of the estimated effect on
the treated country with the size of those obtained by assigning the treatment randomly
to any (untreated) country of the donor pool (Olper et al., 2018). This allows us to assess
whether the effect estimated by the synthetic control for the country affected by the FTA is
large relative to the effect estimated for a country chosen at random (which was not exposed
to the 2008 FTA). Large sample asymptotic inference tests are not appropriate in our case
because our data are of small sample size and identification of the treatment effect arises
from the change in policy by a small group of countries. However, placebo tests à la Abadie
and Gardeazabal (2003), Bertrand et al. (2004), Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) can be used
to evaluate the significance of treatment effects (Adhikari and Alm, 2016). The essence
of placebo tests is to test whether the estimated impact of the 2008 FTA could be driven
entirely by chance.
Abadie et al. (2015) propose an inference procedure where they permute which unit is
assumed to be treated and estimate, for each j ∈ {2, ..., J + 1} and t ∈ {1, ..., T}, α̂j,t as
described above. Then, they compute the test statistic for the ratio of the mean squared
prediction errors (i.e., the ratio of post/pre treatment mean squared prediction errors). They
name this ratio as RMSPE. In addition, they propose to calculate a p-value:
p =
∑J+1
j=1 1[RMSPEj ≥ RMSPE1]
J + 1
, (3)
where 1[⊕] is the indicator function of event [⊕], and reject the null hypothesis of no effect
if p is less than some pre-specified significance level (Ferman et al., 2018).15
3.2.2 Pretreatment Fit Index
We also use the pretreatment fit index to assess whether the comparison country created by
the synthetic control method is a ‘good’ counterfactual following the work of Adhikari and
Alm (2016) and Adhikari et al. (2018). We use this index to assess the overall quality of
the pretreatment fit. The advantage of the pretreatment fix index is that it normalizes the
RMSPE. This makes it possible to compare the fit between different SCM models. This is
15Although the p-value from this placebo test lacks a clear statistical interpretation, this test is commonly
used in the SCM applications. Ferman and Pinto (2017), Hahn and Shi (2017), Ferman et al. (2018), Firpo
and Possebom (2018) provide comprehensive discussions using both theoretical and Monte Carlo methods.
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done by defining the benchmark RMSPE, which is obtained from the zero-fit model.16 The





The range for this index is [0,U], where U is the finite upper bound, meaning that the
RMSPE is equivalent to the RMSPE obtained when the difference between the treated and
the synthetic unit is U percent for each pre-treatment year (Adhikari et al., 2018). If the
index is 0, then the fit is perfect. An index greater than 1 indicates a poor fit and synthetic
units should be discarded. We report the pretreatment fit index and the RMSPE values.
If the preintervention ‘fit’ is good, the post intervention counterfactual is likely to be more
accurate.
4 A Counterfactual Design for NZ Exports
The goal of this section is to assess the impact that the 2008 NZ-China FTA has had on
NZ’s exports to China. A method for generating a hypothetical counterfactual is to look
at the outcomes where there has been no treatment, that is a control group. We need a
control that tells us what the outcome variable for NZ would have been without the 2008
China-NZ FTA. Since an exact control does not exist (we have no post-2008 observations on
NZ where the FTA with China was not signed), we create a control group by synthesizing
the performance of countries similar to NZ; and the experiences of the control group would
form the basis of a hypothetical counterfactual for the treatment country.
4.1 Construction of the Synthetic NZ
We use annual country-level data for the 1991-2015 period. This gives us a pre-intervention
period of 17 years (1991-2007) and a post-intervention period of 8 years (2008-2015). Recall
that the synthetic NZ is constructed as a weighted average of potential control countries in
the donor pool. The countries we use to construct our synthetic NZ is a donor pool of 24
OECD member countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
























17We start with the 35 OECD countries; however, we automatically exclude Chile since Chile had an
FTA with China before 2008. We exclude Turkey and Mexico because of their middle-income status and
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come variable is (nominal) exports to China, measured in current US dollars. Motivated
by the gravity model18 as predictors of trade flow, we use nominal GDP, GDP per capita,
population and bilateral exchange rates, and population weighted distance between country
i and China (see Appendix A.1).
Data for trade flows are from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database,
which uses the United Nations’ Comtrade database. WITS reports several nomenclatures
and we use the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC2-Division) data to extend
the sample period. We also source all of our SITC2 commodity level export values from the
WITS, along with total exports to the world. All are measured in current US dollars. From
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI), we retain the variables for GDP
(in current US dollars) and population (World Bank, 2018). Exchange rates are from the
OECD.19 Exchange rates are measured in national currency per US dollar. This is used to
construct the variable national currency per Chinese yuan, which is the national currency
reflected in Chinese yuan on an annual level. Finally, we use the population weighted distance
from the GeoDist dataset of the CEPII.20
We construct a synthetic NZ, where weights are chosen so that each donor country’s root
mean square prediction error (RMSPE) is minimized and the resulting synthetic NZ best
reproduces the actual NZ in the preintervention period. The transparency of the synthetic
control estimation allows us to see what donor countries are being used to construct the
synthetic NZ and the particular weights applied to each country. We calculate the weights
assigned to each country in the control group in the construction of the counterfactual
outcomes. Five countries receive positive weights. In this case the synthetic NZ is a weighted
combination of Canada (4.8%), Iceland (13.9%), Japan (0.7%), Portugal (78.5%) and Sweden
(2.2%). All other countries obtain zero weights within the donor pool.21
these two countries cannot be named as peer countries to the NZ economy. We also exclude the post-
communist countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic. Belgium
and Luxembourg are excluded because of their small sizes and limited trade flow observations. Thus, a
sample of 24 OECD countries are used to construct our synthetic NZ.
18The gravity equation has been used as a workhorse for analysing the determinants of bilateral trade flows
since Tinbergen (1962). Head and Mayer (2014) provide a historical review of the fundamental equation
and discuss theory-consistent estimation, covering number of alternative techniques. Estimating the gravity
equation is beyond the scope of this current paper.
19http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SNA_TABLE4
20The CEPII (The Centre d’Études Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales) gathers and har-
monizes data from different sources, produces indicators and statistical measures (http://www.cepii.
fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/bdd.asp). We take the related CEPII variables from their dataset GeoDist
(http://www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=6). GeoDist provides several geo-
graphical variables, bilateral distances measured using city-level data to account for the geographic distri-
bution of population inside each nation. We use the population weighted distance.
21Like for nearest neighbor matching estimators, most of the synthetic control weights are equal to zero
and a small number of untreated countries contribute positive weights.
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Table 1 displays the pre-treatment characteristics of the NZ economy and compares
them with the characteristics of the sample average and the characteristics of the weighted
average of the 24 OECD countries using the synthetic control weights. We include three
lagged values of exports in 1995, 1996, and 2006 as additional predictors. We include lagged
values to minimize the possible problem of time-constant restriction on predictors (Chung et
al., 2016). These lagged values can also explain the time trend of exports to China. Overall,
the synthetic NZ provides a much better comparison than using a sample average of the
OECD countries in the donor pool.
Table 1: Trade predictor means before the NZ-China FTA
NZ Synthetic NZ OECD Sample
GDP 7.24E+10 1.88E+11 1.10E+12
GDP per capita 18517 17865 32233
Population 3847029 10600000 35119669
Bilateral exchange rate 0.23 1.52 8.38
Weighted distance 10241 9707 7876
Lagged exports 1995 0.35 0.33 2.76
Lagged exports 1999 0.33 0.31 3.08
Lagged exports 2006 1.21 1.24 13.2
RMSPE 0.193
Note: All variables are averaged over 1991-2007.
4.2 Counterfactual and Inference Tests
Figure 3 displays the exports trajectory of NZ and its synthetic counterpart. During the
preintervention period the synthetic NZ almost exactly reproduces the exports of NZ to
China. This close fit in the exports to China and the values from Table 1 demonstrate that
there is some combination of other countries that reproduce the economic attributes of NZ
trade before the FTA was signed. Therefore, one does not need to extrapolate outside the
data to generate a counterfactual. The divergence between the treated and synthetic NZ
post agreement is an indication of the gains from trade in the NZ export sector. The large
divergence in the export sector between NZ and its synthetic counterpart occurs within the
same year as the FTA. The calculated pretreatment fit index is 0.037. This means on average,
there is a 3.7% difference between the treated unit and the synthetic unit in the pretreatment
period. The estimated effect of the FTA on NZ’s exports is given by the difference between
actual NZ exports and that of its synthetic counterpart, shown in Figure 3. Exports at
11
its peak in 2013, were 260% higher than the synthetic counterpart. Both the immediate
divergence and magnitude of the estimated effect, relative to the counterfactual indicates
how important and impactful the FTA was on the NZ export sector.
RMSPE = 0.193
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NZ
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Figure 3: Exports to China: NZ versus synthetic NZ
Next, we perform the placebo tests. The placebo test works by iteratively applying
the treatment of interest on all other control units within donor pool. This procedure can
then provide a distribution of estimated placebo treatment effects for all countries within the
sample pool. They are placebo effects because the countries in the donor pool by construction
have never experienced the intervention. We can then compare the main synthetic result
against all other estimated placebos. If the estimated effect for the NZ case is unusually
large compared to the distribution of our control units, we can infer that the treatment
of interest had a significant effect. The bold line in Figure 4 shows the synthetic NZ’s
estimated treatment effect against all other estimated treatment effects from the donor pool.
The synthetic NZ stands outside the distribution of the placebo studies, providing some
confidence that the estimated effect isn’t purely by chance but instead driven by the effect
of the FTA.
We make statistical inferences by looking at the ratios between the pre-2008 RMSPE
and the post-2008 RMSPE for NZ and for all other countries within the donor pool. The
importance of the ratio comes from controlling for a large RMSPE in the post intervention
period, when that same country also has a large RMSPE in the pre intervention period, thus
giving a small post-to-pre ratio. Therefore, a large RMPSE in the post treatment period
12
does not mean that it is a statistically large effect, if the fit is ‘bad’ in the pretreatment
period. This post/pre-FTA RMSPE value is shown in Figure 4 and NZ stands out as the
country with has highest post/pre-FTA RMSPE. Therefore, if one were to pick a country at
random from the sample, the chances of obtaining a ratio as high as observed for NZ is 1/25
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Figure 4: Placebo tests for exports
4.3 Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
Whether or not bilateral trade agreements, such as the NZ-China FTA, promote or divert
trade remains unclear within the literature. Figure 3 and 4 both demonstrate the large
increases in the import and export sectors for NZ. However, one can see declines in exports
to and imports from NZ’s other two major trading partners, Australia and the US. In what
follows, we employ the SCM to examine the overall effects the 2008 FTA had on NZ’s exports
to the world and exports to the world excluding trade with China. Keeping the same donor
pool and retaining the same covariates that explain trade, we adjust the outcome variable
to total exports in current US$.
Figure 5 shows NZ’s exports to (i) the world, (ii) the world excluding China, and (iii)
China. NZ’s exports to the world follow the same outcome path as the exports to the world,
had NZ never traded with China. Although primitive, the large gap in exports to world
and exports to the world excluding China suggests two things. Firstly, the NZ-China FTA
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increased total exports to the world for NZ. In the pretreatment period, NZ was exporting
very little to China as the difference between the two exports series suggests. However, the
large increase in NZ’s total exports seems to be driven by an increase in trade with China,
which coincides with the signing of the FTA. This suggests trade creation.



































Total exports without China
Figure 5: Export destinations of NZ: China versus rest of the world, 1991-2015
Panel (a) in Figure 6 shows the counterfactual analysis of what NZ’s total exports would
have been had the FTA never occurred. In the counterfactual outcome, given by the dashed
red line, total exports to the world would have been 22% less in 2014 if NZ had never signed
this FTA. In panel (c), the counterfactual analysis of the outcome variable is exports to the
rest of the world if NZ never traded with China (total exports without China). Thus, if NZ
had never signed an FTA with China, the counterfactual outcome tells us that total exports
to the world would not have changed. In order words, if the synthetic outcome was higher
than the treated unit, this would suggest that NZ might have traded more with the world
had the FTA never been signed. However, we see no difference between the actual outcome
of exports and the synthetic outcome. Therefore, the FTA actually increased total export
trade for NZ and did not experience a trade diversion effect, or at least a trade diversion
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(d) Placebo: Exports Excluding China
Figure 6: Trade creation and trade diversion
4.4 The Two Most Important Export Sectors
Table 2 shows the NZ industry share of imports and exports to China.22 In 2007, NZ’s
export share of food and animals (SITC 0) was 36%. By 2017, this share increased to 61.4%,
making up more than half of NZ’s trade with China. The share of crude oil (SITC 2) being
exported to China was 44% in 2007, this decreased to 27.4% in 2017. The other remaining
products in the SITC code make up only a small share of exports to China. We explore the
SITC 0 and SITC 2 industries and how they were affected by the NZ-China FTA.23
We employ the SCM at the sector level to examine the effects of the NZ-China FTA
on NZ’s two main exporting industries: (i) food and live animals (SITC 0), and (ii) crude
materials (SITC 2). Panel (a) in Figure 7 shows the evolution of NZ’s food and live animals
exports, which includes NZ’s dairy exports. Had NZ never signed the FTA with China, its
food and live animal’s exports would have been 185% less in 2014. This finding suggests that
the FTA was an important factor for expanding export growth of NZ’s food and live animals
sector. The bold line in panel (b) represents the percentage export gap for the food and live
22The share of exports to China is calculated by dividing any industry exports to China by total trade to
China of goods in that year.
23In construction of the sector level exports it is important to note that SITC 0 (food and live animals)
main component of trade with China is dairy products and birds’ eggs (SITC 02). Appendix A.2 provides
a discussion of this.
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animals, the gap between actual exports and its synthetic control, in NZ between 1991 and
2015. The real gap in NZ very closely tracks in the zero-gap line, which indicates a good
fit. Gray lines represent placebo tests and they are the deviations from synthetic control
for the other control countries in the dataset. The next main sector for NZ’s exports to
China is crude materials (Table 2). Panel (c) suggests that crude materials would have been
exporting more than what NZ currently exports if the FTA never been in place. However,
the placebo distribution in panel (d) shows that this is not a significant effect due to the
large RMSPE in the pretreatment period, followed by a small post-treatment RMSPE.
Table 2: What does NZ export to and import from China?
Export share (%) Import share (%)
SITC Industry 2007 2017 2007 2017
0 Food and live animals chiefly for food 36.0 61.4 2.3 2.3
1 Beverages and tobacco 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.1
2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels 44.0 27.4 0.6 0.6
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials 0.001 0.001 0.1 0.1
4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes 4.5 0.3 0.1 0.1
5 Chemicals and related products, nes 4.2 2.3 4.9 6.7
6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials 6.0 1.9 16.6 17.1
7 Machinery and transport equipment 4.0 0.8 37.6 42.6
8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.8 0.3 37.7 29.5
9 Commodities and transactions not classified 0.4 5.0 0.2 0.9
Source: United Nations Statistics Division, Commodity Trade Statistics Database.
Overall, the trade analysis shows how the FTA helped promote trade creation through
NZ’s main export sectors. Had the FTA never been signed, NZ’s total exports to the world
would have remained the same. We have shown total exports to China in 2013 was 260%
higher than the counterfactual counterpart. Most of the drive in increased exports seems to
be coming from the dairy industry, which in 2016 made up 56% of NZ’s exports to China.
The estimated export gains from the FTA are in line with trade creation rather than trade
diversion from other main trading partners. The estimated export growth at the sector level
was mainly in the sector of food and live animals. The second largest export sector, crude
materials, was shown have been negatively impacted by the FTA as both the counterfactual
and reduction in share of exports to China demonstrate. Although not all industries are
examined here, our analysis shows that the dairy sector, which is NZ’s primary exporting
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(d) Placebo: Crude Materials
Figure 7: Sector level counterfactuals
5 A Counterfactual Design for Real GDP Per Capita
NZ, as a small open economy, relies heavily on the international market which is reflected
through the terms of trade. Understanding the economic costs that a large developing
country can have, via international trade, on NZ and quantifying this effect is a considerable
task. That is, what would NZ’s GDP per capita have looked like if NZ had never signed the
2008 FTA with China. From the causal estimation results of exports, signing the FTA with
China improved NZ’s export sector. We explore whether this has been reflected in GDP per
capita in NZ. By invoking the SCM, we study the path of real GDP per capita had NZ never
signed the FTA with China.
5.1 Data
We use annual country-level data for the 1990-2014 period. We end our sample period in
2014 because we would like to use the latest version of the Penn World Tables, which ends
in 2014 (see below for a discussion). We use a standard set of economic growth predictors
for real per capita GDP, our main dependent outcome variable in this section. This set of
covariates are based on a set of growth models within the literature and in a broad sense are
meant to capture the impact of institutions, demography and macroeconomic conditions as
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well as standard growth accounting variables (such as stock of physical and human capital)
(Barro, 1991; Mankiw et al., 1992). We also base our set of predictor variables on other SCM
models used in the literature, which explore growth effects of structural reforms measured
by real GDP per capita (Abadie et al., 2015; Adhikari and Alm, 2016; Meyersson, 2017;
Adhikari et al., 2018). The variables we use and data sources are described below.
Variables from the Penn World Table: The Penn World Tables (PWT hereafter)
provide data on many indicators for a substantial amount of countries on aspects such as
relative levels of income, output, production factors, productivity, etc. The latest version,
PWT 9.0, includes 182 countries between 1950 and 201424 and features several upgrades in
concepts, methods and data sources (Feenstra et al., 2015). PWT 9.0 is prepared on the
basis of major upgrades in the concepts and methods of the underlying national accounts
of the different participating countries to the 2011 round of the International Comparison
Program.
From the PWT 9.0, we retain the variables for (i) GDP, (ii) population, (iii) employment,
(iv) physical capital, (v) human capital, and (vi) openness. Specifically, we use the variable
rgdpe (expenditure-side real GDP at current PPPs (in millions of 2011 US$))25 for GDP, and
pop (population (in millions)) for population, with which we calculate GDP per capita for
each country. The human capital index (variable hc) is constructed following the procedure
implemented by Hall and Jones (1999) and Caselli (2005), combining years of schooling with
the appropriate rates of return. We use the variable ck (capital stock at current PPPs (in
millions of 2011 US$)) for physical capital stock,26 and pop (population (in millions)) for
population, with which we calculate physical capital per capita for each country. We use the
variable cshx (share of merchandise exports at current PPPs) for export share, and cshm
(share of merchandise imports at current PPPs) for import share. These are summed (i.e.,
export share plus import share) to calculate a measure of openness. Finally, we generate a
variable, which is the share of population employed. This variable is generated by taking
emp, which the number of people engaged in working (millions) divided by the total level of
people pop (in millions).
Variables from the WDI: From the WDI (World Bank, 2018), we retain the variables
for (i) age dependency ratio, (ii) share of female labor force, (iii) fertility, (iv) land area, and
(v) inflation.27
24All versions of the PWT are available at https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/productivity/pwt/.
25Expenditure-side real GDP, using prices for final goods that are constant across countries and over time.
26The physical capital variable (capital stock ck) is measured in terms of current PPPs (in millions of
2011 US$) and includes a wide range of assets such as residential and non-residential structures, transport
equipment, computers, communication equipment, software, etc.
27Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents – people younger than 15 or older than 64– to the
working-age population – those ages 15-64. Total fertility rate represents the number of children that would
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Variables from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem): Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem) provides a multidimensional and disaggregated dataset that reflects the complexity of
the concept of democracy as a system of rule that goes beyond the simple presence of elec-
tions. From V-Dem (https://www.v-dem.net/en/), we retain the variable for democratic
participation. There are many measures and varieties for capturing democratic participation
of countries. Democracy is more than free and fair elections, as theorists often suggest dif-
ferent models in capturing democratic measurements. We use the participatory democracy
index v2xpartipdem put forward by Coppedge et al. (2017). They focus on five key princi-
ples that offer a distinctive approach to defining democracy electoral, liberal, participatory,
deliberative and egalitarian. In this case the participatory principle of democracy empha-
sizes active participation by citizens in all political processes. As our donor pool is made up
of OECD countries, all countries score high on this index (and on alternative indices).
5.2 Results
Table 3 shows the predictor means for NZ and its synthetic counterpart alongside the OECD
average over the preintervention period. This demonstrates how well the SCM is performing
relative to the OECD average in terms of matching the covariates of the treated unit. We
calculate the weights of each individual donor country used in the construction of the syn-
thetic counterfactual. From the available number of donor countries, the synthetic control
is a weighted combination of Canada (6.4%), Germany (18.7%), Hungary (24.9%), Israel
(32.3%) and Japan (8.9%), with lower weights on Poland (4.5%) and Portugal (4.4%). All
other countries obtain zero weights within the donor pool.
Figure 8 plots the time paths of real GDP per capita for NZ and its synthetic counterpart
between 1990 and 2014. The synthetic real GDP per capita trajectory is constructed by using
the combination of countries within the donor pool that closely resemble NZ’s real GDP per
capita before signing the FTA with China. During the preintervention period, the synthetic
NZ closely follows actual real GDP per capita. The RMSPE is 0.024 and the fit index is
0.005, which suggest that, on average, there is only a 0.5% difference between NZ and its
synthetic counterpart in the preintervention period. After signing the FTA with China,
indicated by the vertical blue dashed line in 2008, NZ’s real GDP per capita suffers a small
dip, which is brought on by the 2007-2009 global financial crisis (GFC), but this effect is also
be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance
with age-specific fertility rates of the specified year. The land area of a country’s total area, excluding area
under inland water bodies, national claims to continental shelf, and exclusive economic zones. In most cases
the definition of inland water bodies includes major rivers and lakes. Inflation is measured by the consumer
price index which reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a
basket of goods and services.
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captured in the synthetic counterpart. The treated country of interest (NZ) should not have
undergone any structural shocks during the intervention period, as this would cause doubt
on how isolated the treatment effect was. Bilgel and Karahasan (2017) point out structural
breaks such as the 2007-2009 global financial crisis (GFC), that had affected the entire donor
pool, does not invalidate the synthetic control estimates. The effects of the GFC on NZ’s
GDP per capita are summarized as: The average annual growth rate of GDP per capita was
-1.1% between 2007 and 2009. In the post GFC recovery period, the 2010-2014 period, NZ’s
GDP per capita grew at a rate of 2.7% on average. Figure 8 clearly supports the growth
estimates as NZ and its synthetic counterpart trend upward together in the post-GFC era.
Table 3: GDP per capita predictor means preintervention period
NZ Synthetic NZ OECD average
Human capital 3.27 3.20 3.20
Openness 0.57 0.67 0.72
Share of population employed 0.46 0.45 0.46
Capital per capita 68628 77232 97080
Age dependency ratio 52.13 52.35 49.68
Share of female labor force 44.90 43.92 43.52
Fertility 2.01 1.90 1.67
Land area 263310 726829 1267279
Inflation 2.32 8.95 5.46
Democratic participation 0.61 0.58 0.61
Lagged GDP per capita (1994) 23323 23199 25735
Lagged GDP per capita (1998) 25867 26067 30527
Lagged GDP per capita (2002) 28483 28718 33804
Lagged GDP per capita (2006) 29329 29273 36808
RMSPE 0.0239
The estimated impact of the NZ-China FTA on per capita income is given by the dif-
ference between the actual and the synthetic real GDP per capita. In 2009, NZ’s real GDP
per capita was 0.84% higher than that of the synthetic NZ due to the FTA. In 2014 the
estimated effect of the FTA on NZ’s real GDP per capita was only 1.15% higher than the
counterfactual GDP per capita. This suggests the FTA-induced impact, albeit positive, was
very small (especially compared to the export gains); therefore, may not have led to a large
impact on NZ’s welfare, income per person and general living standards.
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RMSPE = 0.024
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Figure 8: Real GDP per capita counterfactual
5.3 Inference and Robustness Tests
To ensure that the synthetic control estimates reflect the impact of the intervention, we
perform the placebo test. Panel (a) in Figure 9 shows the placebo distribution of all other
donor countries against our synthetic NZ. After artificially assigning the FTA treatment
period on them, we compare where our synthetic NZ sits relative to the distribution and
calculate the post/pre value. This post/pre value allows us to identify the exact significance
of the estimated effect from the FTA (see panel (b) in Figure 9 for the post/pre values).
This ratio is the p-value and can be interpreted as the probability of obtaining a post/pre
value that is at least as large as the ones obtained through artificially assigning treatment
to the unexposed countries. In other words, if a country had been selected at random from
the sample, the probability of obtaining a post/pre RMSPE at least as high as that of NZ
is 0.88 (=22/25). This test suggests that the NZ-China FTA had no direct causal effect on
NZ’s real GDP per capita.
We conduct a sensitivity test to assess the potential pitfalls that can occur when using the
SCM. It has become a popular choice within the application of the SCM to include the entire
pretreatment outcome path of the outcome variable as part of the set of economic predictors
(i.e., include all past lagged observations of the dependent variable). Kaul et al. (2017)
argue that researchers should never use all pre-intervention outcome periods of the dependent
variable as economic predictors. Firstly, they use the Billmeier and Nannicini (2013) data
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to illustrate the shortcomings of the SCM. More specifically they changed the pretreatment
outcome lags of the dependent variable, in addition to the set of other covariates. This
drastically changed the outcome of the synthetic control and the estimated impact of the
treatment effect. Secondly, a further shortcoming of this method is the choice to include the
entire pretreatment outcome path as economic predictors leads to the irrelevancy of other













































(a) Per Capita GDP Placebo Tests (b) Post/Pre−FTA RMSPE
Figure 9: Inference tests
We examine the concern of Kaul et al. (2017) that including all outcome lags for pre-
treatment years will render the other predictor variables useless and change the outcome
trajectory of the synthetic unit. By plotting our original choice of pretreatment outcome
lags against several other combinations of outcome lags, we examine the synthetic unit’s
sensitivity under different specifications. Figure 10 shows the variations in the synthetic
outcome due to changes in alternative lagged outcomes. The solid black is our actual GDP
per capita (in PPP terms) and the solid red line is the benchmark result that we have pro-
vided for our counterfactual analysis. Experiment 1, denoted by ‘E1’ is GDP per capita
with all the past outcome lags. ‘E2’ includes only even years of the lagged outcome co-
variate. ‘E3’ includes outcome lags at 5-year intervals (i.e. 1995, 2000, and 2005). ‘E4’,
following Meyersson (2017), considers only the last 5 years of the pre-intervention period.
Following the recommendation of Kaul et al. (2017), ‘E5’ is just the last outcome lag of the
intervention period (in this case it is 2007).We argue that due to the low variation within
each specification, our synthetic alternatives follow a similar outcome path to the benchmark
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specification. Therefore, it appears our main results under the alternative specifications will
not significantly change the estimated results.
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Figure 10: Synthetic NZ GDP per capita with various outcome lags
5.4 Terms of Trade
The choice to use real GDP on the expenditure-side as our measure for economic well-being
is influenced by its inclusion of a country’s terms of trade.28 Terms of trade, the ratio of
export prices to import prices, measure a country’s purchasing power abroad and is closely
related to gains from trade (see Kohli, 2003, 2004; Kehoe and Ruhl, 2008; Reinsdorf, 2010).
NZ is a small open economy and relies on its external sectors as a source of economic growth
and development. Accordingly, we use the newly developed GDP on the expenditure-side
from PWT 9.0 as this accounts for changes in terms of trade.
PWT 9.0 provides two different real GDP measures (at chained PPPs): (i) expenditure-
side real GDP to compare relative living standards across countries and over time (variable
rgdpe); (ii) output-side real GDP to compare relative productive capacity across countries
and over time (variable rgdpo). To demonstrate the difference between these two GDP
measures, we plot the two variables for real GDP and per capita real GDP. Figure 11 shows
that GDP series close match each other over time. However, during 1950-2014, rgdpe was
higher than rgdpo. For example, real GDP on the expenditure-side was 2.9% higher than real
28See Feenstra et al. (2009, p. 201) for a simple example to illustrate this.
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GDP on the output-side, on average, between 1991 and 2014. A country will have favourable
ToT if it receives a relatively high price for its exports and pays a relatively low price for
its imports. This tends to make rgdpe higher than rgdpo (Feenstra et al., 2015).29 This is
exactly the case for NZ. We are interested in examining if the FTA with China improved
economic welfare for NZ. Accordingly, our benchmark results are based on the real GDP on
the expenditure-side (variable rgdpe). Having said that, we replicate our exercises using the
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Figure 11: Real GDPe vs. Real GDPo at chained PPPs
Figure 12 shows the evolution of terms of trade in NZ between 1980 and 2016. NZ’s terms
of trade since the mid-1980s have grown steadily and increased markedly between 2000 and
2007. NZ is a primary commodity exporter, and the increase in the country’s terms of trade
during the 2000s reflected rising export prices. In addition, as argued by Steenkamp (2014),
NZ has benefited from reductions in non-oil import prices due to increased levels of low-cost
manufacturing production in emerging Asian economies. Nevertheless, declines in the terms
of trade occurred over the GFC and the huge reduction in dairy prices of 2014 is reflected
in Figure A4. Grimes (2006) finds that a rise in NZ’s commodity’s terms of trade is driven
largely by real price rises in the agricultural sections. In addition, an increase of terms of
trade for NZ can explain the strong GDP growth that NZ has experienced since 2001. At
the same time volatility in NZ’s terms of trade has increased. Higher variability in terms of
29It is important to note that the gap between these two measures of real GDP is not a measure of the
gains from trade for countries, or at least, not the gains from trade as compared to autarky.
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trade has been shown to cause reallocation of both inputs and outputs (Grimes, 2006). This
discussion adds to the idea that by utilizing the real GDP per capita from the PWT 9.0, we
are able to capture an important driving factor for NZ’s economic growth performance.

















Figure 12: NZ’s terms of trade, 1980-2016
6 Conclusions
Our paper is timely as recently FTAs all over the world have been negotiated or renegoti-
ated.30 We highlight that there is evidence to suggest that bilateral trade agreements are
an important factor for export growth and overall increase levels of exports at the sector
level. This is suggestive of increased productivity in its primary industry and perhaps a more
permanent reallocation into the country’s competitive advantage. Overall, NZ has seen large
increases in exports to China, which are supportive of trade creation. The agricultural sector
has benefited from such an agreement. The caveat to these findings is the concentration shift
at the sector level of NZ’s exports to China. This is especially important within the dairy
sector, whose exports have increased from 36% in 2007 to 56.4% in 2016. China is NZ’s
biggest export partner in terms of merchandise goods, and any predicted down turn in the
Chinese economy would have serious implications for NZ’s trading and flow on effects for
30Canada, Mexico, and the US signed a trade deal to replace NAFTA at the G20 summit in Argentina on
30 November 2018. It is known as the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement, or USMCA.
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the economy. China’s recent urbanization is a driver for the huge increase in demand for NZ
milk powder, which dominates the NZ dairy exports to China (Kendall, 2014). However, the
future developments in the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership may
provide NZ with an opportunity to further diversify its export partners and insulated itself
from any unexpected exogenous shocks in prices and overseas demand.31
Our findings regarding the counterfactuals for GDP per capita do not suggest any specific
welfare impact that trade might have on NZ. As noted by some scholars, GDP can be a
flawed measure of economic welfare (Sen, 1999; Coyle, 2014; Jones and Klenow, 2016), and
it is possible that GDP per capita may not capture all welfare effects that globalization
has generated (e.g. dispersion of technology, increased productivity, rates of innovation,
etc.). Nevertheless, GDP per capita remains an important measure for economic growth
despite the measurement pitfalls. While our paper is not an examination on possible welfare
metrics, evaluating economic growth and well-being is a considerable task. Finally, carefully
constructed dynamic multi-country, multi-sectoral general equilibrium models that take into
account sectoral linkages between tradable and non-tradable sectors will likely provide many
valuable insights for policymakers (see Caliendo and Parro, 2015; Caliendo et al., 2018). For
the NZ case, it would be interesting to examine how a small open economy is affected by
trade with such a large open economy in terms of productivity and reallocation of resources.
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Kaul, A., Klößner, S., Pfeifer, G., Schieler, M. 2017. Synthetic control methods: Never use
all pre-intervention outcomes together with covariates. Unpublished Manuscript (29 July
2017 version), Accessed January 27, 2018, https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83790/1/
MPRA_paper_83790.pdf
Kehoe, T. J., Ruhl, K. J. 2008. Are shocks to the terms of trade shocks to productivity?
Review of Economic Dynamics, 11(4), 804-819.
Kendall, R. 2014. Economic linkages between New Zealand and China. Reserve Bank of
New Zealand Analytical Notes AN2014/06.
Kohli, U. 2004. Real GDP, real domestic income, and terms-of-trade changes. Journal of
International Economics, 62(1), 83-106.
Kohli, U. 2003. Terms of trade, real GDP, and real value added: A new look at New
Zealand’s growth performance. New Zealand Economic Papers, 37(1), 41-66.
Kreif, N., Grieve, R., Hangartner, D., Turner, A. J., Nikolova, S., Sutton, M. 2016. Exami-
nation of the synthetic control method for evaluating health policies with multiple treated
units. Health Economics, 25(12), 1514-1528.
Mankiw, N. G., Romer, D., Weil, D. N. 1992. A contribution to the empirics of economic
growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2), 407-437.
Matta, S., Appleton, S., Bleaney, M. Forthcoming. The impact of the Arab spring on the
Tunisian economy. The World Bank Economic Review, https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/
lhw059
30
Meyersson, E. 2017. Pious populists at the gate: A case study of economic development in
Turkey under AKP. Economics of Transition, 25(2), 271-312.
Mideksa, T. K. 2013. The economic impact of natural resources. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 65(2), 277-289.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT). 2007. New Zealand-China free trade agree-
ment, national interest analysis. Retrieved from: https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/
FTAs-agreements-in-force/China-FTA/National-interest-analysis.pdf
Mohan, P. 2017. The economic impact of hurricanes on bananas: A case study of Dominica
using synthetic control methods. Food Policy, 68, 21-30.
Montalvo, J. G. 2011. Voting after the bombings: A natural experiment on the effect of
terrorist attacks on democratic elections. Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(4), 1146-
1154.
Nannicini, T., Billmeier, A. 2011. Economies in transition: How important is trade openness
for growth? Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 73(3), 287-314.
Olper, A., Curzi, D., Swinnen, J. 2018. Trade liberalization and child mortality: A synthetic
control method. World Development, 110, 394-410.
Osborn, D. R., Vehbi, T. 2013. Empirical evidence on growth spillovers from China to New
Zealand. New Zealand Treasury Working Paper 13/17.
Pinotti, P. 2015. The economic costs of organised crime: Evidence from Southern Italy.
Economic Journal, 125(586), F203-F232.
Powell, B., Clark, J. R., Nowrasteh, A. 2017. Does mass immigration destroy institutions?
1990s Israel as a natural experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 141,
83-95.
Puzzello, L., Gomis-Porqueras, P. 2018. Winners and losers from the e uro. European
Economic Review, 108, 129-152.
Reinsdorf, M. B. 2010. Terms of trade effects: Theory and measurement. Review of Income
and Wealth, 56(s1), S117-S205.
Ritzel, C., Kohler, A. 2017. Protectionism, how stupid is this? The causal effect of free
trade for the world’s poorest countries: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Switzerland.
Journal of Policy Modeling, 39(6), 1007-1018.
Rubin, D. B. 1974. Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandom-
ized studies. Journal of Educational Psychology, 66(5), 688-701.
Saia, A. 2017. Choosing the open sea: The cost to the UK of staying out of the euro.
Journal of International Economics, 108, 82-98.
Sen, A. 1999. Development as freedom. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
31
Singhal, S., Nilakantan, R. 2016. The economic effects of a counterinsurgency policy in
India: A synthetic control analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, 45, 1-17.
Smith, B. 2015. The resource curse exorcised: Evidence from a panel of countries. Journal
of Development Economics, 116, 57-73.
Steenkamp, D. 2014. How volatile are New Zealand’s terms of trade? An international
comparison. Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, 77(2), 3-14.
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Appendix A
Appendix A.1 Gravity Features of Trade Data
The graphical representations of trade data show the key gravity features of bilateral trade
flows and motivate our use of the gravity model (see also Head and Mayer, 2014, Section 1.1).
The first important feature of trade data is how exports and imports rise proportionately
with the economic size of a country. Using GDP as a proxy for the economy size, Figure A1
shows NZ’s exports (imports) to (from) OECD countries in 2006.32 On the vertical axis is
NZ’s exports to OECD countries and on the horizontal axis is GDP in current US dollars for
2006. The line shows the predicted values for a simple regression of log trade flows on log
GDP. Both panels in Figure A1 suggest a near unit elasticity which demonstrate that trade
flows rise in proportion to the size of the economic destination.
Figure A2 illustrates the second key empirical relationship embodied in the gravity equa-
tion, the strong negative relationship that exists between physical distance and trade. Fig-
ure A2 shows NZ’s exports/imports after accounting for GDP or size of respective trading
partners, and both panels demonstrate the “spirit” of the gravity gravity model, as it displays
how trade is inversely proportional to the distance between two countries.
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Figure A2: Trade inversely proportional to distance, 2006
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Appendix A.2 A Look at the Dairy Sector
Figure A3 clearly shows that dairy products and birds’ eggs (SITC 02) is the largest compo-
nent of food and live animals (SITC 0) exports to China (SITC 02/SITC 0). Figure A3 also
plots the share of SITC 02 in total exports going to China (SITC 02/SITC Total) between
2000 and 2017, and suggest that dairy and birds’ eggs is a major component of exports to
China (SITC 02/SITC Total). There is a noticeably sharp increase in NZ’s dairy exports
to China in the post-2008 NZ-China FTA era. It is possible that these sharp increases in
dairy exports may be driven by reduced tariffs and change in food/dairy prices. Figure A4
shows the evolution of the FAO food price index (FFPI) and the FAO dairy price index
(FDPI) between 1990 and 2017 (where the base period is 2002-2004) to explore this point
further.33 Food prices (and dairy prices) experienced a strong upswing in 2007 and 2008,
reaching historically high levels. For the whole of 2008, the FFPI averaged 201.4 points, up
24.8% from 2007 and representing the highest annual average. Food prices declined 18.7%
from 2014 to 2015. The decline was more severe for dairy price index. For the whole of 2005,
the FDPI averaged 160.3 points, down 28.5% from 2014. Overall, the FDPI averaged 202.2
points in 2017, up 31.5% from 2016. This also provides an explanation behind the large
drop in NZ exports to China during 2014-2015, which coincides with a drop in the FFPI and
the FDPI. Table 2 displays that more than half of the NZ exports to China is the category
of food and live animals (SITC 0). Therefore, a drop in the dairy price index is significant
contributing factor to the decline in NZ total exports to China over 2014-2015.
Lastly, we mention the so-called Fonterra contamination incident. On 3 August 2013,
Fonterra, one of the world’s largest dairy companies, informed the NZ’s Ministry for Primary
Industries (MPI) of a possible food safety issue relating to a suspected contamination of whey
protein concentrate with Clostridium botulinum. China ordered the recall of potentially
contaminated milk imported from New Zealand after this incident. This temporary ban
didn’t impact whole milk powder and skim milk powder or imports of infant milk formula
that had already been processed.34 Stojkov et al. (2018) note that the affected products made
up only a small proportion of NZ’s dairy exports, with the vast majority of dairy exports
being unaffected. On 28 August 2013, MPI announced that further testing confirmed no
products had been contaminated. The incident was a false alarm. However, the Chinese
ban remained in place until October 2014. Stojkov et al. (2018) examine the impact of a
food contamination scare in the dairy sector on dairy exports using SCM and find that there
was an initial negative shock to the exports of products that were thought to have been
contaminated, but that there were no significant sustained impacts on other dairy products.
They argue that total dairy exports were 0.6-1.9% lower than they would have been had the
scare not occurred.
33Data are available at http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/. The Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) FFPI was introduced in 1996. The only major modification made to it
was in 2009, when its base period was updated to 2002-2004. FFPI consists of the average of five commodity
group price indices (meat, dairy, cereals, vegetable oil, and sugar), weighted with the average export shares
of each of the groups for 2002-2004. FDPI consists of butter, skim milk powder, whole milk powder, and
cheese price quotations and world average export trade shares weight the average for 2002-2004.
34https://www.nbr.co.nz/article/china-lifts-temporary-ban-fonterra-whey-products-one-russia-remains-bd-164795
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Figure A3: NZ’s dairy products and birds’ eggs exports to China (%), 2000-2017
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Figure A4: Annual food price indices (2002-2004=100), 1990-2017
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